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Abstract
We provide new evidence on the impact of diminished self-control on social preferences
in the ultimatum game. In a sample of German university students (N = 312), depleted
proposers made lower offers, and depleted responders rejected unfair offers as often as
non-depleted ones. This agrees with previous evidence on the Dictator Game but stands
in contrast with a previous study with a sample of Spanish university students. A possible
explanation is that selfish motives are the default mode of behavior, but there is individual
heterogeneity on whether strategic fairness (fear of rejection) can overcome them.
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1 Introduction
Several recent contributions have examined the effects of exhausted self-control on social
preferences. The general logic is that depleted self-control resources increase reliance on
automatic processes of decision making, uncovering the “default” motives underlying behavior
(e.g., Muraven et al., 1998). The basic hypothesis is that selfishness is implemented through
∗We thank Roy Baumeister, Eliran Halali, Kathleen Vohs, two anonymous referees, and participants at
the Cologne Social Cognition Meeting 2016 on Self-Regulation and Self-Control for helpful comments and
suggestions. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Research Initiative “Center for Psychoeco-
nomics” at the University of Konstanz, funded within the German “Exzellenzinitiative”. Wagner also grate-
fully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through research fellowship
WA3559/1-1.
♦Department of Social Sciences, Zeppelin University. Am Seemooser Horn 20, D-88045 Friedrichshafen,
Germany. Email: anja.achtziger@zu.de
NLaboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Department of Economics, University of Zurich,
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more automatic processes on which participants rely more under self-control depletion, while
prosocial motives are implemented in a controlled way. Consistent with this hypothesis, in
the Dictator Game (DG) depleted participants give less than non-depleted ones (Achtziger
et al., 2015). Also, in a small-sample study (N = 29) by Halali et al. (2013), proposers in the
Ultimatum Game (UG) made lower offers. However, in the UG proposer behavior entails a
strategic element, as the responder might reject (low) offers. Hence “fear of rejection” is an
additional motive. The basic hypothesis only remains unchanged if this motive is implemented
in a deliberative (controlled) way.
Halali et al. (2014) showed that depleted responders in the UG rejected more unfair
offers than non-depleted ones. The interpretation is that responder decisions result from the
interaction between monetary concerns and affective (impulsive) processes, the latter leading
to the rejection of unfair offers and being implemented more automatically than monetary
motives.
However, in a previous, large study (N = 288; Achtziger et al., 2016) we found that
depleted proposers made on average higher offers and depleted responders accepted more
unfair offers than non-depleted ones. The UG sessions in Achtziger et al. (2016) were run in
Spain, on the same week and in the same laboratory as the DG sessions in Achtziger et al.
(2015). Participant samples were disjoint but drawn from the same population. For the
interpretation of the UG results, the DG study implies that “fear of rejection” is even more
automatic than monetary concerns for proposers in the UG. That is, in that study, depleted
proposers were motivated by fear of not getting the money if rejected and responders just
wanted to get away with any positive amount of money in the game.
In addition to self-control depletion, a number of techniques and manipulations have been
used to investigate the question of which is the default mode of behavior in social decision
making. Piovesan and Wengström (2009) showed that more selfish decisions are associated
with shorter response times in a variant of the DG, which is consistent with the view that
monetary concerns are more automatic (hence generally faster) for proposers. However, Fis-
chbacher et al. (2013) found a marked heterogeneity in response time patterns when subjects
are classified according to their responder behavior in a series of mini-ultimatum games,
implying that conclusions derived from response time measurement might be elusive in the
domain of social preferences. Cappelen et al. (2016) found that fair decisions in a DG were
faster than selfish ones and inferred that fair decisions are more intuitive, but Myrseth and
Wollbrant (2016) argue that median response times are too large to support this conclusion
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(because all decisions might have entailed deliberation) and that the argument might suffer
from a reverse-inference fallacy.
Sutter et al. (2003) investigated the effects of time pressure on responder behavior in the
UG, the idea being that this manipulation impairs controlled processes and forces decision
makers to rely on automatic processes more often. Responders were more likely to reject
under time pressure, indicating that emotional reactions are more automatic and accepting
every positive amount is the result of a more controlled, slower process. However, Sutter
et al. (2003) also found that the effect disappears with repetition. Cappelletti et al. (2011)
also investigated time pressure in the UG. The study employed the strategy method, that is,
responders responded to each possible offer before knowing the offer, hence effectively stating
a minimum threshold of acceptance (MTA). Every participant played both as a proposer and
as a responder. As in Sutter et al. (2003), responders were more likely to reject under time
pressure. However, proposers were found to offer more under time pressure in Cappelletti
et al. (2011). The authors argued that this reflects more strategic considerations than other-
regarding preferences: strategic proposers might make offers above their own MTA to avoid
rejection, expecting the responder to behave as the proposer would.
Other studies have employed cognitive load, which is assumed to differentially impair con-
trolled processes, hence leading to an increased reliance on automatic processes. Cappelletti
et al. (2011) also tested cognitive load in the UG, but there was no significant effect neither
for proposers nor for responders. Benjamin et al. (2006) and Hauge et al. (2009) also found
no effects of cognitive load in dictator games. The exception is Schulz et al. (2014), where a
particularly strong cognitive load manipulation was used. In this study, dictator mini-games
were used, where participants chose between a fair and an unfair allocation. High-load con-
dition subjects chose the fair allocation more often than low-load subjects. Cornelissen et al.
(2011) also find no main effect of cognitive load in a dictator game; however, they do find an
interaction effect in which participants classified as pro-social in a different task were more
generous in the high-load condition.
The effects of manipulations as cognitive load or time pressure have also been studied
in the framework of cooperation, employing, e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma or public good games.
Although those games are strategically quite different from the UG and other games used to
study social preferences, cooperative behavior in the face of a dominant, “egoistic” strategy
(defecting in the Prisoner’s Dilemma or refraining from contribution in public good games)
is conceptually related to prosocial behavior in DG/UG games. Duffy and Smith (2014)
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found some evidence that subjects under (high) cognitive load behaved less strategically
in a repeated multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game, but, at the same time, the rates of
cooperation were slightly lower among them compared to subjects under low load. In contrast,
Døssing et al. (2017) find that subjects under higher cognitive load showed higher levels of
initial cooperation in a repeated public goods game. Rand et al. (2012) (see also Rand et al.,
2014) reported increased cooperation in social dilemmas for subjects under time pressure and
put forward the hypothesis that cooperation is intuitive and grounded on a “social heuristic.”
However, this evidence is highly contested: Tinghög et al. (2013) failed to replicate the results
in a series of five experiments; a registered multi-lab replication (Bouwmeester et al., 2017)
found no causal impact of time pressure on cooperation; and Myrseth and Wollbrant (2017)
contest the analysis in Rand et al. (2012, 2014) and argue that the data on those papers does
not actually support the conclusion that cooperation is intuitive.
In view of the inconsistent findings regarding the default mode of behavior in social deci-
sion making, it is clear that previous evidence is insufficient to fully understand the impact
of ego depletion and other manipulations in this field. We focus here on ego-depletion ma-
nipulations and present additional evidence on the effects of diminished self-control on social
preferences, by using an almost identical design for the UG as in Achtziger et al. (2016), but
a different subject pool (German university students).
In addition to the main question of interest, this work also contributes to the recent
discussion on the effects of ego depletion on decision making, which has pointed out that
effect sizes might have been overestimated due to publication bias (see, e.g., Carter and
McCullough, 2014) and has raised doubts on the effects of certain manipulations (Hagger
et al., 2016).
Vohs et al. (2008) showed that ego-depletion effects intensify when repeated decisions are
made subsequently (as each subsequent decision requires self-control). Achtziger et al. (2015,
2016) used a framework with repeated decisions and confirmed that the effects of depletion
manipulations do not vanish over the course of an experimental session with repeated decisions
in strategic games. We follow those works and rely on a framework with repeated decisions.
Also as in Achtziger et al. (2015, 2016), we used monetary incentives in the manipulation
task. This is of independent interest, as the vast majority of studies using depletion manip-
ulations use non-incentivized tasks, but our previous studies showed that incentivizing the
manipulation task does not counteract its effects on self-control.
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2 Design and Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the Univer-
sity of Konstanz (Germany). It comprised 13 sessions of 12 proposers and 12 responders each
(N = 312). Average earnings were 11.02 Euros. Subjects were recruited through ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015), excluding students from economics or psychology.
The two-part setup followed Achtziger et al. (2016). Part 1 used a task from Baumeis-
ter et al. (1998) for 5 minutes. In the low-ego-depletion (LED) treatment, participants had
to cross out all “e” letters in a series of paragraphs (blocks) from a physics textbook. In
the high-ego-depletion (HED) treatment, participants had to cross out “e”s following a more
demanding rule which required inhibition and hence depleted self-control resources. Specif-
ically, “e”s had to be crossed unless either another vowel followed the letter or if there was
another vowel exactly two letters away in either direction. Participants typed the number of
crossed-out “e”s per block on-screen, and we checked the number of blocks actually worked
out.
In part 2, participants played 12 Ultimatum Games (UGs) under perfect-stranger match-
ing. In each UG, the proposer offered a share of a fixed monetary amount of 7 units (an
integer from 0 to 7), and the responder decided whether to accept it or reject it (in which
case both players received nothing). Participants were randomly allocated to the two roles.
Participants were not aware of which version of the ego-depletion task their opponents had
faced (they were also not aware of the fact that there were two versions).1
We used only two of the incentive treatments in Achtziger et al. (2016) (called LED-F
and HED-P there). LED subjects received a flat-fee of 8 ECU (exchange rate 1 ECU = 0.25
Euros) for the depletion manipulation, whereas HED subjects received 4 further ECU for each
correctly-solved block, and 2 ECU for each near miss (+/− 1 crossed-out “e”s). Feedback on
the number of correctly-solved blocks was given at the end of the part. This change was made
to ensure that participants would work in the demanding task, but should be inconsequential
because Achtziger et al. (2016) found no differences in UG behavior accruing to the payment
method in part 1. Another difference was that, as previous studies, Achtziger et al. (2016)
included an habituation phase where all participants had to cross out all “e”s. However,
Baumeister et al. (1998) reported no habituation phase, and recent implementations of the
task do not include it (Sripada et al., 2014; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2015). We will return to these
1In five sessions half of the proposers and half of the responders were in each treatment, as in Achtziger et al.
(2016). The remaining sessions employed “pure matchings” between proposers and responders (HED/HED,
HED/LED, LED/HED, and LED/LED). There were no matching effects.
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Figure 1: Histogram of proposers’ offers.
differences in the discussion.
3 Results
The HED task was cognitively more demanding than the LED task. Compared to LED
subjects, in part 1 HED subjects worked on significantly less blocks (HED, mean 1.564; LED,
2.673; Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) test, z = 11.662, p < 0.001) and solved significantly less
blocks correctly (1 point per correct answer, 0.5 per near miss: HED, mean 0.183; LED,
0.403; WRS test, z = 3.705, p < 0.001).
Depleted proposers offered less than non-depleted proposers with 36% of the offers made
by HED proposers being 3 or less, compared to only 24% of offers made by LED proposers
(Figure 1). In the first period (which is of particular interest as the decision is unaffected
by learning effects), depleted proposers offered an average of 2.949, compared to 3.218 by
non-depleted proposers. OLS regressions on first-period offers in Table 1 confirm that HED
proposers offered less, revealing a significantly negative ego-depletion coefficient (p = 0.042
in Model 1, p = 0.043 in Model 2). Contrary to Achtziger et al. (2016), a gender dummy in
Model 2 revealed no evidence for gender differences on offers.
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Model 1 Model 2






Observations (subjects) 156 156
R2 0.027 0.027
Table 1: OLS regressions on first-period proposer offers. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05.
Regarding repeated interactions, Figure 2(a) illustrates a weakly decreasing trend in av-
erage offers, with depleted proposers offering less than non-depleted proposers in 11 out of
12 periods (overall average 2.677 in HED, 2.821 in LED). Table 2 reports panel GLS regres-
sions on proposer offers with standard errors clustered by session and subject random effects.
Model 1 controls for acceptance rate and acceptance of the previous offer; Model 2 controls
for period and gender. Both models confirm that HED proposers made significantly lower
offers (p = 0.021 and p = 0.034, respectively). The effect of the acceptance rates of previous
offers and whether the last round’s offer was accepted are significantly negative. That is,
offers decrease as offers are accepted (Roth et al., 1991). Unlike in Achtziger et al. (2016),
depletion did not interact significantly with the number of blocks worked or the number of
correctly-solved blocks, and including those variables did not improve model fit.
Regarding responder behavior, average acceptance rates are almost identical between
treatments in the first period (HED, 0.910; LED, 0.923; χ2 = 0.084, p = 0.772). The
average acceptance rate over all periods was 0.834 for LED and 0.865 for HED responders.
In both treatments, the per-period acceptance rate increases slowly over time after an initial
drop (Figure 2(b)). Table 3 reports probit panel regressions with subject random effects and
standard errors clustered by session. Large offers increase the likelihood of acceptance in all
models, and acceptance becomes significantly more likely as more unfair offers are observed.
However, the ego-depletion coefficient is not significant (p = 0.749 in Models 1 and 2). Adding
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(b) Responder acceptance rates
Figure 2: Proposer and responder behavior over time.
Model 1 Model 2
Accept rate until t− 1 −0.314∗∗ −0.322∗∗
(0.153) (0.157)
Accept at t− 1 (Yes=1) −0.077∗∗ −0.074∗∗
(0.035) (0.037)









Number of groups (subjects) 156 156
Wald χ2 22.95 22.83
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Table 2: Random-effects GLS regressions on proposer offers. Standard errors (clustered by
session) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05.
4 Discussion
Results for proposer behavior are in line with the hypothesis that monetary/egoistic concerns
are implemented more automatically than fairness concerns. This agrees with Achtziger
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Model 1 Model 2
Offer at t 2.293∗∗∗ 2.322∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.262)
Unfair offer accumulated 0.223∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.082)









Number of groups (subjects) 156 156
Wald χ2 139.22 139.63
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Table 3: Random-effects probit regressions on responder acceptance. Standard errors (clus-
tered by session) in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
et al. (2015), in which depleted proposers made lower offers in a Dictator Game. Regarding
responder behavior, ego depletion had no significant effect on acceptance decisions even after
adding further controls.
The discrepancy with Achtziger et al. (2016), where depleted proposers made higher offers
and depleted responders accepted more unfair offers, is particularly interesting. At this point,
four possible factors contributing to an explanation need to be discussed.
The first factor concerns a minute difference in the experimental design, reported above.
Contrary to Achtziger et al. (2016), and in the interest of speed, we did not include an
“habituation phase” in the current experiment. In such a phase, all participants have to
cross out all “e”s before moving on to the actual depletion task, the logic being that habitual
behavior (to be inhibited later or not) is enhanced in this way. However, at the time of
the experiment the psychological literature was unclear on whether such a phase was needed
or not. The original paper introducing the “e” task did not report a habituation phase
(Baumeister et al., 1998), and other experiments in the literature reported using the task
without a habituation phase (e.g. Wan and Sternthal, 2008). A variant of the task was
implemented by Sripada et al. (2014) in a computerized version which employs no habituation
phase (also used in Alós-Ferrer et al., 2015). However, after our experiment, a multi-lab
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registered replication report (Hagger et al., 2016) failed to find significant effects using the
computerized version of Sripada et al. (2014). Baumeister and Vohs (2016) responded raising
doubts on whether the task was appropriate to induce ego depletion at all. Their main
objection was the lack of an habituation phase in the computerized task used in Hagger
et al. (2016). Hence, one could transfer the criticism to our experiment, as we did not use a
habituation phase here (but we did in Achtziger et al., 2015, 2016).
Of course, we cannot discard this interpretation. However, it should be observed that
the issue raised with the replication of Hagger et al. (2016) was that no significant effects
were found. We did find clearly significant effects for proposer behavior in our study, which
are conceptually in perfect alignment with previous results (Achtziger et al., 2015; Halali
et al., 2013). Hence, it his hard to reconcile a view that our task might not have induced ego
depletion with the results we do actually obtain.
The second factor concerns an even subtler difference in the experimental design, also
reported above. In the experiment, the results of the incentivized depletion phase were given
to participants after that phase, instead of at the end of the experiment as in Achtziger
et al. (2015, 2016). This change, which helped presenting the tasks as completely separate,
appeared unproblematic to us because the magnitude of the involved incentives is tiny. Recall
that performance (number of blocks correctly solved) was identical to earnings in the depletion
task in the HED but not in the LED condition. Participants in both conditions received a
payment of 8 ECU for working on the task, but those in the HED condition received an
additional piece rate of 4 ECU for each correctly solved block (or 2 ECU for an almost-
correctly solved block). The mean piece-rate earnings due to the piece-rate incentives in
the depletion task was .94 ECU (SE = 1.82) for proposers and 1.19 ECU (SE = 1.99) for
responders. Since the exchange rate was 1 Euro = 4 ECU, the average piece-rate earnings
were about 25 Eurocents, which is quite small in comparison to the total amount earned in
the experiment (mean 11.02 Euros).
Still, it is not possible to completely rule out spillover effects from the depletion task
to behavior in the UG. We therefore reran all regressions reported above including earnings
in the depletion task as an additional regressor. This additional variable had no significant
impact on proposer offers or responder acceptance decisions in any of the regressions. Its
inclusion did not improve the overall fit of any of the models, and it did not change the effect
of any of the previous regressors of interest.2 Hence, there is no evidence that earnings in the
2For example, adding the earnings variable to Model 1 in Tables 1, 2, and 3 yields coefficients of β = .006
(SE = .048, p = 0.894), β = −.006 (SE = .028, p = .844), and β = .026 (SE = .069, p = .703), respectively.
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depletion task influenced behavior in the UG.
The third factor and possible reason for the discrepancy with Achtziger et al. (2016) is
sample heterogeneity. It is tempting to speculate that Spanish’ subjects’ intuition might be
more altruistic than that of German subjects. However, this evidence is at odds with the
results of Achtziger et al. (2015), where depletion resulted in clearly lower offers for Spanish’
subjects playing the DG.3
The fourth factor is also related to sample heterogeneity. Although this is of course
speculative, we hypothesize that the dominant responses for the UG uncovered in Achtziger
et al. (2016) might be driven by local economic conditions. After the recent economic crisis,
prospects for Spanish university students were rather bleak, with youth (under 25) unemploy-
ment rates in the 42-56% range for Spain (compared to, e.g., the 7-11% range for Germany)
in the period 2009-13. On the face of gloomy economic prospects, strategic monetary motives
might have become heavily automatized. That is, monetary concerns (selfishness) are imple-
mented more automatically than prosocial ones, but for a population permanently exposed
to dire economic prospects (University students in Spain), the need to secure the monetary
payoff (by e.g. reducing the possibility of rejection through higher offers) might have become
even more automatized. This is, however, a post hoc interpretation and, since we did not
collect socioeconomic variables which could be used as controls, we cannot further explore it
as a possible explanation.
In any case, the discrepancy in results between this paper and our previous work should not
obscure the main point. The depletion manipulation we employ is rather short and subtle.
Just a few minutes of crossing out letters on a piece of paper seems to alter the balance
between motives underlying the decisions summarized by social preferences. The fact that
such a mild intervention can affect decisions in strategic contexts indicates that the balance
between selfish, prosocial, and other motives is a very fragile one, easily tilted by seemingly
irrelevant factors.
The purpose of psychological manipulations as ego depletion, cognitive load, or time pres-
sure in games as the UG or the DG is to uncover the “default” mode of behavior by inves-
tigating whether prosociality or selfishness are implemented more automatically/impulsively.
Results in this field might be mixed because of individual and sample heterogeneity. That is,
dominant/default responses might be more selfish for some decision makers, and more (ap-
3As pointed out by one reviewer, the depleted proposers in Achtziger et al. (2016) were offering more
even though they faced responders who were willing to accept less, which could be construed as a strategic
failure. However, the strategic behavior referred to here would assume that proposers hold correct beliefs on
the responders’ behavior and are also perfectly aware of the true effects of the manipulation on others.
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parently or truly) prosocial for others. This view is natural if one recalls that, as pointed out
by Bargh (1989), automatic decision processes are often those which have become “autom-
atized,” i.e., for context-dependent decisions what is more automatic depends on individual
experience. We expect that, as long as no theory to identify (or experimental procedure to
manipulate) the underlying dominant response (motivation) of individual participants is de-
veloped, the effect of psychological manipulations on social preferences in strategic settings
can go either way.
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Alós-Ferrer, C., Hügelschäfer, S., Li, J., 2015. Self-Control Depletion and Decision Making.
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics 8, 203–216.
Bargh, J.A., 1989. Conditional Automaticity: Varieties of Automatic Influences in Social
Perception and Cognition, in: Uleman, J.S., Bargh, J.A. (Eds.), Unintended Thought.
Guilford, pp. 3–51.
Baumeister, R.F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., Tice, D.M., 1998. Ego Depletion: Is the
Active Self a Limited Resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, 1252–
1265.
Baumeister, R.F., Vohs, K.D., 2016. Misguided effort with elusive implications. Perspectives
on Psychological Science 11, 574–575.
Benjamin, D.J., Brown, S.A., Shapiro, J.M., 2006. Who is “Behavioral”? Cognitive Ability
and Anomalous Preferences. SSRN Working Paper 675264.
Bouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P.P.J.L., Aczel, B., Barbosa, F., Bègue, L., nas Garza, P.B.,
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Schütz, A., Stamos, A., Tinghög, G., Ullrich, J., van Dellen, M., Wimbarti, S., Wolff, W.,
Yusainy, C., Zerhouni, O., Zwienenberg, M., 2016. A Multilab Preregistered Replication of
the Ego-Depletion Effect. Perspectives on Psychological Science 11, 546–573.
Halali, E., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Meiran, N., 2014. Between Self-Interest and Reciprocity: The
Social Bright Side of Self-Control Failure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
143, 745–754.
Halali, E., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Ockenfels, A., 2013. Is it All About the Self? The Effect of
Self-Control Depletion on Ultimatum Game Proposers. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
7, 1–8.
Hauge, K.E., Brekke, K.A., Johansson, L.O., Johansson-Stenman, O., Svedsäter, H., 2009.
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